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Abstract
Consumptive water use in the Zambezi river basin (ZRB), one of the largest fresh-
water catchments in Africa and worldwide, is currently around 15-20% of total runoﬀ.
This suggests many development possibilities, particularly for irrigated agriculture and
hydropower production. Development plans of the riparian countries indicate that con-
sumptive water use might increase up to 40% of total runoﬀ already by 2025. We have
constructed a rainfall–runoﬀ model for the ZRB that is calibrated on the best available
runoﬀ data for the basin. We then feed a wide range of water demand drivers as well
as climate change predictions into the model and assess their implications for runoﬀ at
key points in the water catchment. The results show that, in the absence of eﬀective
international cooperation on water allocation issues, population and economic growth,
expansion of irrigated agriculture, and water transfers, combined with climatic changes
are likely to have very important transboundary impacts. In particular, such impacts
involve drastically reduced runoﬀ in the dry season and changing shares of ZRB coun-
tries in runoﬀ and water demand. These results imply that allocation rules should be
set up within the next few years before serious international conﬂicts over sharing the
Zambezi’s waters arise.
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1 Introduction
The Zambezi river basin (ZRB), the fourth largest African freshwater catchment and the
largest river system in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), is shared
by eight countries (Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia,
and Zimbabwe). It covers an area twice the size of France (1.37 million km2), is populated
by around 30 million people and discharges an average of around 2600 m3/s (or 82 km3 per
year) into the Indian ocean. In terms of discharge, the Zambezi is of similar size as the Nile
(2830 m3/s) or the Rhine (2200 m3/s).
Current consumptive water use in the ZRB is estimated at around 15 - 20% of total runoﬀ
[19] [23]. The largest consumptive water users are dams (evaporation through impoundment,
ca. 13 km3 p.a.) and irrigated agriculture (ca. 1.5 km3 p.a). This implies many development
possibilities, particularly for irrigated agriculture and hydropower production. Development
plans of the riparian countries in fact suggest that consumptive water use might increase up
to 40% of total runoﬀ already by 2025 [23]. Such expansion of consumptive water use could
become a source of conﬂict among the eight riparian countries.
To start with, the average annual rainfall in the ZRB is quite high (ca. 950mm, based
on CRU estimates by [21]). But it is distributed very unevenly across the basin, with the
southern and western parts receiving much less rainfall than the northern and eastern parts.
Moreover, the more densely populated areas are located in the medium to low rainfall areas.
This asymmetry between water availability and population density is likely to become even
more pronounced in future. As shown in Figure 1, Botswana, Malawi and Namibia are most
likely to experience serious water stress within the next few decades. This heterogeneity















Figure 1: These graphs show projections of per capita water availability [m3/year] in the
eight ZRB countries. The projections are for entire countries, not only their parts in the
ZRB. In these projections, the decline in water availability is driven by population growth
(we use the UN population growth projections). These projections do not take into account
potential changes in runoﬀ that may occur due to climatic changes. Also, they do not take
into account factors other than population growth that may also inﬂuence water demand.
The blue line marks a threshold of 1700 m3/year, which is commonly regarded as a threshold
for water scarcity2.
Another source of heterogeneity and potential conﬂict among the ZRB countries emanates
from the fact that they diﬀer very much in terms of their investment potential and river basin
shares. As shown by Figure 2, Botswana and Namibia have a higher investment potential at
present that could for example be used for water abstraction projects in response to water
scarcity (see also Figure 1). Zambia in turn is likely to claim that due to its very large
geographic and hydrological share in the ZRB it should receive the largest allocation.
To what extent will the water development potential in the ZRB be exploited? How
big is the international conﬂict potential over water allocation issues in the ZRB over the
coming decades? Uncertainty is very high in both respects. On the one hand, the range
of scenarios concerning water demand is very large. Such demand will be driven mainly by
2The Falkenmark index proposes a minimuim of 1700m3 per capita and year for covering basic needs
pertaining to food production, drinking water, hygiene, etc. According to this standard water availability in
the order of 1000m3 per capita and year is considered severe water stress [Falkenmark 1992].
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population and economic growth, agricultural policies, hydropower demand and potential
water transfers within and between river basins. On the other hand, climate models predict
a considerable spectrum of precipitation and temperature changes in the various parts of the
ZRB, making it uncertain how much runoﬀ will be available for anthropogenic and ecological
purposes in the long term.
Figure 2: Zambezi River Basin, with country shares in the basin, precipitation contributions
to the basin, and investment potential (GDP of the country in USD per m3 of water available
in the country, data for 2004). Based on data from [Denconsult, 1998] and [WDI, 2005]. See
Appendix B.3 for details.
Several bilateral and multilateral political arrangements are in place to manage trans-
boundary waters in Southern Africa; notably, the Zambezi River Authority (ZRA, founded
in 1987), the SADC Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems in the Southern African De-
velopment Community (SADC) Region (concluded in 2000), and the Agreement on the
Establishment of the Zambezi Watercourse Commission (ZAMCOM, concluded in 2004).
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The ZRA is bilateral. It involves Zambia and Zimbabwe and concentrates mainly on
managing the Kariba reservoir, the second largest reservoir and hydropower production fa-
cility in the basin (185 km3 storage capacity, 1470 MW (720 North Bank and 750 South
Bank) capacity [32]). The SADC Protocol, to which all eight riparian countries are parties,
includes general criteria and guidelines for managing shared water resources and resolving
disputes. The ZAMCOM agreement, which was negotiated by all ZRB countries and cov-
ers the entire ZRB, is very similar to the SADC Protocol in terms of provisions on how
to manage shared waters. As of October 2009, it is not yet operational because it has only
been signed by seven of the eight riparian countries and has been ratiﬁed by only four of them.
The ZAMCOM agreement envisages the development of a “Strategic Plan” for the basin
and a monitoring mechanism for water abstractions and intra-basin transfers. To what ex-
tent this eﬀort should also result in speciﬁc water allocation rules and how such rules could
be designed remains controversial. This problem is one of the main reasons why the ZAM-
COM has not yet become eﬀective. One fundamental prerequisite for designing an eﬀective
Strategic Plan and possibly also allocation rules is a better understanding of runoﬀ, water
availability and water demand3 over the next few decades. To that end, our paper presents
the results of a computational modeling eﬀort that explores the eﬀects of water demand and
climate change scenarios at key locations in the ZRB.
We have constructed a rainfall–runoﬀ model for the ZRB that is calibrated on the best
available runoﬀ data for the basin. We then feed a wide range of water demand drivers as
well as climate change predictions into the model and assess their implications for runoﬀ.
The results show that, in the absence of eﬀective international cooperation on water alloca-
3Some of the water management literature distinguishes “demand” and “requirements”, with the former
meaning de facto consumption and the latter referring to needs or wants. We prefer to use the term demand,
which in our context is equivalent to future requirements or needs.
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tion issues, population and economic growth, expansion of irrigated agriculture, and water
transfers, combined with climatic changes are likely to have very important transboundary
impacts. In particular, such impacts involve drastically reduced runoﬀ in the dry season and
changing shares in runoﬀ and water demand among the eight ZRB countries. This ﬁnding
implies that allocation rules should be set up within the next few years before serious inter-
national conﬂicts over the sharing of the Zambezi’s waters arise.
2 Scenarios
Consumptive and non–consumptive uses of water in the ZRB have transboundary implica-
tions in the sense that one country’s use of the river aﬀects other countries in the basin.
Such eﬀects are modest at present–, but could increase to the extent, runoﬀ patterns change
due to climate change and water demand increases in future. We examine the implications
of a wide range of scenarios as shown in Table 1 (see next page).
Scenarios A, B, and C describe changes in population, urbanization, irrigated agriculture,
industrial activity/mining, and water storage/hydropower production. Scenario A represents
essentially a status quo scenario, whereas scenario B assumes moderate and scenario C as-
sumes strong growth of the mentioned water demand drivers. Scenario D deals with water
transfers and scenario E pertains to climatic changes. While scenarios A to D focus on water
demand, scenario E relates to the supply side.
We examine the implications of these scenarios at three levels: (1) the subbasin, (2)
speciﬁc locations in the basin (notably, Victoria Falls, Kariba, Kafue Gorge, Cahora Bassa,
and the Zambezi Delta), and (3) the country. To facilitate the presentation and discussion
of results we concentrate on three scenarios combining scenarios A to E as shown in Table
1.
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Scenario Assumptions Sources / speciﬁcs
A minor population and urbanization
growth; no expansion of irrigated agri-
culture compared to present; minor
expansion of industry compared to
present; none of the currently planned
additional water storage facilities is
built
Population/urbanization: low growth UN estimates
for ZRB countries. Agriculture: currently irri-
gated land kept under irrigation at current inten-
sity/eﬃciency. Industry/mining: no further growth
in water demand. Storage: none of the projects men-
tioned in [24] and [23] is implemented
B moderate population and urbanization
growth; moderate expansion of irri-
gated agriculture; moderate expansion
of industry; some of the currently
planned storage facilities are built
Population/urbanization: medium growth UN esti-
mates for ZRB countries. Agriculture: irrigated land
increases to 1.1 Mio ha irrigated land, which amounts
to 3% of the total arable land available [12]. Indus-
try/mining: 5% growth in water demand per year.
Hydropower: half of the projects mentioned in [24]
and [23] are implemented.
C strong population and urbanization
growth; strong expansion of irrigated
agriculture; strong expansion of indus-
try; all of the currently planned storage
facilities are built
Population/urbanization: high growth UN estimates
for ZRB countries. Agriculture: irrigated land in-
creases to 3.1 Mio ha, which amounts to 8% of the
total arable land available. Industry/mining: 10%
growth in water demand per year. Storage facilities:
all of the projects mentioned in [24] and [23] are im-
plemented.
D D1: none of the currently envisaged
water transfer projects is implemented
D2: half of the currently envisaged wa-
ter transfer projects are implemented
D3: all of the currently envisaged water
transfer projects are implemented
Based on information from [29], [28] and [8]
E E1: no signiﬁcant climatic changes in
the ZRB countries
E2: moderate decrease of precipitation
in southern and western parts of the
ZRB, moderate increase of potential
evaporation
E3: strong decrease of precipitation in
southern and western parts of the ZRB,
strong increase of potential evaporation
Based on SRES 1AB, WGI, Fig 10.12 [17] and [4]
Table 1: Scenarios. For more information on data sources and technical details see section
on the demand model below and Appendix D
• Scenario 1: Status quo: A ∪ D1 ∪ E1
• Scenario 2: Moderate demand and supply side changes: B ∪ D2 ∪ E2
• Scenario 3: Strong demand and supply side changes: C ∪ D3 ∪ E3
Any other combination of scenarios A to E would produce outcomes (runoﬀ predictions) that
are located in between the three scenarios just listed. We discussed these scenarios with a
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large number of stakeholders and scientists in the ZRB during three visits to Mozambique,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe in February and September/October 2008 and August 2009. These
three countries contribute around 70 percent to the ZRB runoﬀ and are by far the most
important users in the basin. Based on these discussions we have come to the conclusion
that the scenarios outlined in Table 1 are “realistic”. That is, they lie within the range of
water demand and climatic changes that are currently thought to be possible. Examining the
implications of these scenarios does, of course, not mean that one or the other scenario will
in the end become reality. The main purpose of our research is to understand the magnitude
of the eﬀects on runoﬀ that could result from these scenarios. In other words, our research
intends to test the limits, that is, how sensitive the ZRB is to diﬀerent types and degrees of
changes in water demand and supply (climatic changes), as a whole and at speciﬁc locations
that are important for the eight countries concerned.
Finally, it is important to note that our scenarios operate under the assumption that there
are no eﬀective international water allocation rules for the ZRB. That is, we assume that
each of the eight ZRB countries unilaterally pursues its development plans without interna-
tional eﬀective coordination. We take into account, however, that water consumption by one
country aﬀects water availability in other ZRB countries, depending of course on geographic
location and hydrology. We think that this approach is useful because it explores what
could happen if the current institutional setting in the ZRB, where there are in fact no eﬀec-
tive basin-wide allocation rules at present and where very little international coordination
takes place, prevailed in the long term. That is, our model predicts outcomes that could hap-
pen in the absence of stronger international coordination and eﬀective water allocation rules.
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3 Supply – Demand Model
We use computational simulations to examine the transboundary implications of the scenar-
ios described above. Our model consists of two components: a hydrological model that mim-
ics the natural processes and a demand model that represents deterministic water demand
based on actual water use and water use projections. The model includes some improved
prerequisites compared to existing models, notably a better spatial resolution on the supply
(precipitation, evaporation) and demand side as well as a diﬀerentiated temporal approach.
With the latter we are able to examine seasonal diﬀerences and long term changes in pre-
cipitation (supply side) and also seasonal and long term changes in demand.
3.1 Hydrological (supply) model
Our hydrological model mimics the natural processes as well as the eﬀects on the hydrological
system that result from water use. Compared to the very few existing hydrological models
for the entire ZRB that are in the public domain, notably the model of [16] and the model of
[5], our model is based on improved data for precipitation and evaporation as well as more
information on river discharge for better calibration of the model. The model consists of a
lumped conceptual rainfall-runoﬀ model (RRM) as well as regulated dams for hydropower
production and water storage dams for consumptive water use modeled for each individual
subbasin.
The ﬂow of each RRM is deﬁned as qRRM = qs + qb, where qs is the direct runoﬀ and
qb is the base ﬂow. River ﬂow over time is deﬁned as qRRM(t) = qs(t) + qb(t), where the
surface runoﬀ is deﬁned as qs = (p− e)As · rc and p stands for precipitation, e for potential
evaporation, As for catchment area and rc is a runoﬀ coeﬃcient speciﬁed for each subbasin
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with resulting inﬁltration 1− rc. The base ﬂow is deﬁned as: qb = qbstore + qbover4
dVb
dt
= As(p− eec)(1− rc)− qbstore − qbover − qbcons
qbstore = Vbsc ∀
Vb
As
> hmin else qbstore = 0
We assume that in times of water shortages, i.e. when total consumptive water demand





− hext) ∀ hext ≤ Vb
As
,with base storage volume Vb and outﬂow coeﬃcient sc. ec is the evaporation coeﬃcient, and
eb a scale factor for groundwater evaporation intensity. hext is the maximum evaporation
depth, hmax is the maximum baseﬂow storage level determining the threshold for additional
overﬂow, and hmin is the minimum base outﬂow level.




,where sO is the overﬂow outﬂow coeﬃcient.
For our hydrological model we use gridded and for our subbasins reaggregated monthly
precipitation data from the Climate Research Unit (CRU)5, resampled by [21], evaporation
measurements carried out by various water agencies and power supply companies in the ZRB
[7], [31], [6], and data from sector studies performed in 1998 [5]. For information on predicted
climatic changes (scenarios E, see Figure 3) we rely on IPCC estimates for monthly mean
precipitation values for 2050 (see Appendix D).
4The subscript i indicating the i-th subbasin has been omitted for notational clarity.
5http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/
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Regulated dams for power production are included as follows
dVs
dt
= qin − qpow − qcons − qev − qspill
qev = f(Vs) = (A · V 2s + B · Vs + C)e
,with operation rules based on a deﬁned maximum storage level (Vsmax) for each reservoir.
qspill = 0 ∀ Vsmax ≥ Vs + qin − qev − qcons
qspill = Vs−Vsmax+qin−qev and
dVs
dt
= Vsmax−Vs ∀ Vsmax ≤ Vs+qin−qev−qcons
where qcons represents consumptive water use directly from the reservoir, qspill is the water
ﬂow over the spillway, and parameters A,B and C describe the volume–surface relationship
of the reservoir if no data for this relationship is available. Power production is included as
power(t) = h · ρ · g · qpow · t, with water demand for power production qpow and reservoir level
h.
qpow = Vs ∀ qpow ≥ Vs
Concerning dam/reservoir operation rules, we assume that the only objective is to prioritize
water demand for power production.
Potential new hydro-power production sites are included in terms of increased evaporation
(consumptive water use) from reservoirs.
Further technical details of the hydrological model and the demand model (see next
section) as well as long-term climatological precipitation hydrographs for the 13 sub – catch-
ments and the calibrated parameters can be found in Appendix C.
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3.2 Demand Model
In our demand model we simulate spatially and temporally disaggregated water demand
by four sectors: agriculture, hydropower production, domestic sector, and industrial sector.
Environmental water needs (ecological ﬂows) are not explicitly included in the model as a
sector that actively uses water. But we examine the availability of environmental water ﬂows
when discussing the result of our simulations.
To be able to study basin-wide and transboundary eﬀects our model distinguishes water
demand in terms of consumptive and non-consumptive demand. Similar to the physical
model our demand variables are spatially and seasonally disaggregated. The distribution of
water demand in space follows, where possible, spatial considerations, including distances to
sources and clustering of diﬀerent waterusers in certain areas [13]. We assume that water
use is more intense along the main stream and at locations with more availability, assum-
ing that transportation and infrastructure costs increase with distance from the main water
abstraction points. Moreover, the amount of direct water use decreases with less availabil-
ity. Temporal variation in demand is mainly a function of diﬀering water demand due to
climate-related seasons [5] for agricultural demand and varying electricity demand over the
year [24].
Projections of the demand variables, on which our scenarios rely (see Table 1), are based
on the following sources of information: For agricultural demand we use projections by [5],
national statistics [19]), the Digital Global Map of Irrigation Areas [26], projections by FAO
[11] and the spatial distribution of irrigation according to a satellite derived land-cover map
[20].
For domestic water demand we implement a constant demand throughout the year,
though one might argue that during the wet season less water is used by households than
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in the dry season6. We assume that domestic water demand is met through direct access to
ground- and surface waters. Following common assumptions [30] we consider the distance to
the sources as more important than seasonal variations. In our model, domestic water use is
therefore driven by population growth and its spatial distribution. We use yearly national
statistics [22] and distribute this information spatially according to a satellite derived pop-
ulation density map for 2004 [18]. Additionally we derive an urban-rural distribution based
on urbanization scenarios and urban centers deﬁned by [5], [25] and assume a per capita
consumption of 150 l/day in urban and 27 l/day in rural areas [11].
For industrial water use we take estimates by Zacpro [5] and projections on national
growth [19]. For hydropower generation and water storage projects we use estimates and
information on planned projects from the Southern African Power Pool [24] and SADC [23].
For information on water transfer projects we use [28], [29], [15], [14] and [8]. Further details
on sector shares and development of water demand are included in Appendix B.
6Including seasonal variation in our simulations has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the results.
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4 Results
We start by discussing the results for 13 subbasins before focusing on key locations in the
ZRB and the country level. We distinguish these three levels for several reasons. Sub-
basins are the main components (natural accounting units) of the natural system that forms
the ZRB, which makes it meaningful to study the implications for those components for a
start. Policy choices aﬀecting demand are made at local, national, and international lev-
els. Moreover, policy choices and thus demand by local or national decision-makers have
transboundary eﬀects because the ZRB and several of its subbasins extend across national
boundaries. This justiﬁes systematic analysis of the implications for countries. Finally, there
are, from the perspective of policy-makers and the economy, some particularly important lo-
cations in the ZRB. Kariba, Kafue Gorge, and Cahora Bassa, for example, are crucial to
the electricity supply of the riparian countries, and they generate revenue through electricity
exports. Victoria Falls, another example, is a major tourist attraction in Southern Africa
and thus a source of revenue as well. The Zambezi Delta, Barotse plains, and the Kafue
Flats, yet other examples, are important wetlands that are of local economic value but also
of international importance in terms of their biodiversity.
In essence, the ﬁrst scenario (AD1E1) explores the eﬀects of (modest) population growth
and some minor industrial expansion at the national level (see Appendix D.5). The second
scenario (BD2E2) examines the eﬀects of a “middle-of-the-road” demand expansion in which
the distribution of water demand across sectors remains comparable to the present distri-
bution, combined with moderate climatic changes. In the third scenario (CD3E3), demand
is driven to a major extent by the expansion of irrigated agriculture and combines with
strong changes in climatic conditions. The shares of sectoral water demand under the three
scenarios are shown in the Appendix D.
14
4.1 Subbasins
Since the hydrological model is based on 13 subbasins these hydrological units are the obvious
starting point for studying the implications of our scenarios. Figure 3 shows the subbasins,
and Table 4.1 the mean annual ﬂows in each subbasin in the year 2000 and under the three
scenarios in 2050.
Figure 3: subbasins of the ZRB.
With the exception of the Shire subbasin, where even under the small growth scenario
(AD1E1) a 20% reduction of runoﬀ occurs primarily due to population growth, mean annual
runoﬀ declines only slightly in this scenario the main reductions besides the Shire occurring
in the Zambezi Delta (5%), the Tete subbasin (3%), and the Kafue (9%) and Cuando Chobe
subbasins (4%). The average ﬂow reduction in the 13 subbasins for that scenario is 4% (and
8We do not consider return or drainage ﬂows because drainage takes place naturally during the rainy
season. We assume that all water used for irrigation is consumed. We make this assumption based on
interviews with managers of the Mazabuka and Marromeu sugar farms in Zambia and Mozambique, the
largest irrigation sites in the ZRB. We assume in our simulations that in times of water shortages, i.e. when
total consumptive water demand is bigger than available surface water, additional water will be allocated
directly from the subsurface. This has the eﬀect that in times of water shortages base ﬂows vanish.
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Subbasin Year 2000 AD1E1 BD2E2 CD3E3
1. Delta 2597 2457 2266 1475
2. Tete 1729 1682 1530 872
3. Shire 445 354 320 210
4. Mupata 1248 1188 834 54
5. Luangwa 489 485 484 322
6. Kariba 929 898 588 20
7. Kafue 273 248 200 83
8. Cuando Chobe 32 31 0 0
9. Barotse 1007 1002 683 266
10. Luanginga 58 58 29 0
11. Lungue Bungo 263 263 220 186
12. Upper 253 252 159 13
13. Kabompo 82 82 62 23
Table 2: Mean annual ﬂows [m3/s] in 13 subbasins, indicating total river ﬂow at the end of
each subbasin for the year 2000 and three scenarios for 2050. Note that we use the terms
runoﬀ and water availability synonomously in the remainder of the paper. This variable
measures the water ﬂow that remains after actual (year 2000) or projected water demand
has been met8
5% at the end of the ZRB in the delta)9, the standard deviation is 6%.
In second scenario (BD2E2), all subbasins experience rather drastic ﬂow reductions, the
average is 32%, the standard deviation is 24%. In the Cuando Chobe (100%) annual water
demand would exceed river ﬂow. Besides the Cuando Chobe, the Luanginga (49%), Upper
and Kariba (37%), Barotse (32%) and Mupata (33%) subbasins are the most negatively
impacted. The Zambezi Delta subbasin would lose 13% of its mean annual ﬂow compared
to the year 200010.
The third scenario (CD3E3) has extremely negative eﬀects on annual ﬂows in all sub-
basins. The average reduction of mean annual ﬂow across all subbasins is 70%, the standard
deviation is 26%. The worst aﬀected subbasins are the Cuando Chobe (100%) and the Lu-
9The diﬀerent reduction rates on average and at the end of the river system are due to variation in
climatic and water demand conditions across the subbasins.
10The smaller loss in the Delta (relative to losses in other subbasins) is primarily due to comparatively
small losses in the Shire and Tete subbasins, which are among the largest subbasins.
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anginga (100%) where demand would exceed the available water. The Kariba (98%), Mupata
(96%), Upper (95%), Kafue and Barotse (70% and 74% respectively) and the Zambezi Delta
(43%) would experience severe losses as well.
The negative eﬀects under the second and third scenario are even stronger when we focus
on the dry season. Table 4.1 shows that several of the subbasins could see their water ﬂows
reduced to zero even under the middle scenario. The average reductions for the 13 subbasins
are 10% under the ﬁrst, 70% in the second, and 93% in the third scenario. Simulation results
for the implications of the three scenarios for maximum ﬂows are shown in the Appendix
E. They suggest that, on average, long term problems of water scarcity are more important
than problems of ﬂooding.
Subbasin Year 2000 AD1E1 BD2E2 CD3E3
1. Delta 2126 1964 1561 485
2. Tete 1457 1397 1071 118
3. Shire 279 181 110 0
4. Mupata 996 873 500 0
5. Luangwa 87 82 0 0
6. Kariba 748 687 399 12
7. Kafue 159 131 63 46
8. Cuando Chobe 26 24 0 0
9. Barotse 204 198 0 0
10. Luanginga 15 14 0 0
11. Lungue Bungo 124 123 82 37
12. Upper 34 33 0 0
13. Kabompo 3 2 0 0
Table 3: Mean minimum ﬂows [m3/s] in the dry season, projected for 2050 (October).
Precipitation hydrographs for the 13 subbasins are included in Appendix C.
4.2 Speciﬁc locations
Figure 4 shows the implications of the three scenarios for Victoria Falls, one of the major
tourist attractions (and thus a source of revenue) in Southern Africa. This ﬁgure also il-
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lustrates that the eﬀects are likely to be especially harmful in the dry season. While the
ﬁrst scenario has very little eﬀect compared to the present state, even the second scenario
could stop the water ﬂow at Victoria Falls for nearly half of the year (August to January).
The third scenario could leave the Falls dry for eight months of the year. According to a
study by SADC, the minimum environmental ﬂow required to maintain the character and
touristic value of the Victoria Falls is 400m3/s [23]. This threshold is approached during
the dry season even today. Figure 5 shows the eﬀects on electricity production at the three
Figure 4: Mean monthly ﬂows at Victoria Falls: Scenario AD1E1 (dashed), BD2E2 (dots),
CD3E3 (solid line). The ﬂows in scenario AD1E1 are almost the same as contemporary
ﬂows. We thus omit the latter in this ﬁgure.
largest production sites in the ZRB: Cahora Bassa, Kariba, and Kafue Gorge. Interestingly,
the second scenario (BD2E2) has only a small eﬀect on hydroelectric power production, es-
pecially at Kafue Gorge and Cahora Bassa compared to reductions at Kariba. We interpret
this result in the sense that reduced river ﬂows over the year can be compensated through a
better storage of peak ﬂows. Peak ﬂows are currently passing mainly through the spillways
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of Kafue and Cahora Bassa (i.e. they are not stored and then used for power production) or
are lost through evaporation in the large inundated ﬂood-plains11.
However, in the third scenario (CD3E3) two of the three hydropower production sites
experience dramatic losses. At Cahora Bassa the loss is 65%, at Kariba it is almost total.
The Kafue hydroelectric power plant could maintain its output with currently applied op-
eration rules12, but only in ways that violate current agricultural/ﬁsheries and ecological
objectives with respect to the Kafue Flats. The estimates for Kafue shown in Figure 5 do
not take into account such objectives. We think that maximizing power production at the
expense of agriculture/ﬁsheries and ecosystems in the Kafue Flats is an unlikely scenario.
This ecosystem is very important for the local economy in terms of traditional farming, ﬁsh-
eries, and tourism. This circumstance would probably prevent hydropower plant operators
from maximizing electricity production (which is assumed in our simulation). Hence the
model predictions for power production at Kafue are probably too optimistic.
As regards the most important wetlands in the ZBR, which are important from an agricul-
ture and ﬁsheries, biodiversity and tourism perspective, it makes more sense to examine the
subbasin level, rather than speciﬁc locations. As discussed above, the Zambezi Delta could
experience ﬂow reductions in the order of 5% (ﬁrst scenario) to 13% (second scenario) to
43% (third scenario). In the Kafue subbasin, these reductions could be 9%, 27% and 70% re-
spectively. In the Barotse subbasin, reductions of 1%, 32% and 74% respectively could occur.
Figure 6 illustrates some interesting diﬀerences in ﬂow reductions across the three main
wetlands in the ZRB. In the Barotse subbasin the lack of hydraulic infrastructure for river
11Data for the year 2006 ([31], [6]), for example, shows that water ﬂows at Kafue Gorge between March
and August of that year consisted on average of 650 m3/s discharged over the spillway and 970 m3/s of
turbinated water. At Cahora Bassa the corresponding shares in the same time-period were 342 m3/s and
1493 m3/s. At Kariba all water can currently be turbinated, except at times of very large runoﬀ (ﬂoods).
12At present, operation rules for the Kafue are deﬁned by two dams. One dam upstream (Itezhi Tezhi)
serves as the main reservoir. From there water is released to the Kafue Gorge Dam 300 km downstream
where there is only a very small reservoir.
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Figure 5: Hydropower Scenarios AD1E1 (blue), BD2E2 (green), and CD3E3 (red)
regulation results in complete drying up in some months even in the second scenario. In the
Kafue subbasin peak ﬂow is reduced but minimum ﬂows can be kept at a higher level due
to releases from the Itezhi-Tezhi reservoir. Flows in the Zambezi Delta are generated by a
combination of regulated ﬂows from the Cahora Bassa reservoir and unregulated ﬂows from
Lake Malawi. Due to a seasonal shift of rainfall and increasing runoﬀ resulting from climate
change our model predicts a changing pattern of river ﬂow during the wet season. Because
there is virtually no reliable data on river discharge in the Delta our model relies on rough
estimates (see Appendix C). Hence it is very diﬃcult to make good predictions of discharge
behavior in that subbasin. Nevertheless, compared to subbasins with unregulated ﬂows (e.g.
Barotse subbasin) we expect that ﬂow reductions are more evenly distributed across the year.
From an environmental point of view especially the Kafue subbasin faces accute water
shortages. Required minimum environmental ﬂows in the Kafue subbasin are assumed to
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be at least 250m3/s during the low ﬂow season [5]. Because water abstractions reduce ﬂows
quite considerably already at present this minimum is often not reached even today. Or it is
artiﬁcially approached by dam regulation at Itezhi Tezhi. Hence the prospects for the Kafue
subbasin look rather dire despite the possibility of additional releases from the Itezhi Tezhi
dam. For the Zambezi Delta a minimum ﬂow of 250m3/s, as suggested by SADC [5], is met
in all the three scenarios. For the Barotse Plains, where our scenarios BD2E2 and CD3E3
assume large abstractions upstream, we are not able to ﬁnd any proposals for minimum
environmental ﬂows in the literature.
Figure 6: Mean annual ﬂows in the Barotse Plains (before conﬂuence with the Chobe), Kafue
Flats (before conﬂuence with the Zambezi River), and discharge into the Indian ocean at
the Zambezi Delta: Scenario AD1E1 (dashed), BD2E2 (dots), CD3E3 (solid line)
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4.3 Country level
The estimates presented above show that increasing water demand combined with climatic
changes could lead to dramatic reductions of water ﬂow at key points in the ZRB. Such re-
ductions are per se highly problematic. However, in addition they are likely to also produce
substantial shifts in relative water availability and water demand across countries. Such
shifts could lead to international conﬂict. In our model and the simulation results for the
three scenarios the water available to any given country in the ZRB is, to the extent that
a country is contiguous to or downstream of other countries, aﬀected by changes in water
demand and climatic conditions in those countries. This dynamic process generates changes
in water availability in absolute terms (runoﬀ in a country in one of the three scenarios
compared to the year 2000) and in relative terms (that is, relative to changes in runoﬀ in
other countries). We assume that from the perspective of national policy–makers both types
of changes are important.
Table 4 shows the average annual runoﬀ in the eight ZRB countries in the year 2000 and
under the three scenarios. On average, runoﬀ decreases by around 5% under the ﬁrst, 25%
under the second, and 66% under the third scenario. In the second scenario, the most neg-
atively aﬀected countries are Botswana, Namibia, Angola as well as Tanzania and Malawi.
Under the third scenario, the most negatively aﬀected countries are Zimbabwe, Zambia,
Botswana and Namibia. Table 3 also shows that most national shares in total available ZRB
water change across scenarios. These diﬀerences indicate that both absolute and relative
changes in runoﬀ are important. For example, while the share of ZRB water that remains
available in Mozambique increases from 27% to 44%, the shares of Zimbabwe and Zambia
decline from 19% to 11% and 18% to 12% respectively.
Similarly, national shares in total consumptive water demand in the ZRB are also likely
to change (see Table 5). Because the ﬁrst Scenario (AD1E1) is driven mainly by population
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Country Year 2000 AD1E1 BD2E2 CD3E3
[m3/s] [%] [m3/s] [%] [m3/s] [%] [m3/s] [%]
Angola 493 5 491 5 335 5 161 5
Botswana 1048 11 1040 11 688 9 263 8
Malawi 439 5 349 4 316 4 208 6
Mozambique 2596 27 2423 26 2235 31 1455 44
Namibia 1025 11 1018 11 674 9 262 8
Tanzania 439 5 349 4 316 4 208 6
Zambia 1768 18 1703 19 1347 18 399 12
Zimbabwe 1860 19 1784 19 1379 19 371 11
Total 9669 100 9159 100 7290 100 3326 100
Table 4: Runoﬀ in the eight ZRB countries. For the deﬁnition of basin shares and catchment
areas relevant to the individual countries see maps in the Appendix B.2.
growth, which is particularly high in Malawi, the latter’s share in total ZRB water consump-
tion grows most strongly (from 5% to 14%) though Zambia remains the biggest water user in
the system. Because of massive growth of irrigated agriculture Zambia’s water consumption
share grows from 30% to 39% to 42% (from 2000 to scenario three). The biggest drop occurs
in Zimbabwe, whose share declines from 33% to 29% to 11%. This massive shift in consump-
tive shares occurs mainly because Zambia has much more land that is suitable for irrigated
agriculture than Zimbabwe. Finally, we take a look at changes in water availability (runoﬀ)
COUNTRY Year 2000 AD1E1 BD2E2 CD3E3
Angola 0.2 0.2 9 12.6
Botswana 0.3 0.3 0.2 1.4
Malawi 5 14.2 11.4 9.8
Mozambique 26.7 24 19 17.6
Namibia 0.5 0.4 0.6 1.9
Tanzania 0.4 1.5 4.8 3
Zambia 33.5 30 39.1 42.3
Zimbabwe 33.4 29.5 16 11.5
Total 100 100 100 100
Table 5: National shares in total consumptive water demand in the ZRB (domestic, industrial
and agriculture water demands, and evapotranspiration from reservoirs)
and demand in combination. As shown in Figure 7, the eight ZRB countries cluster at ﬁve
places in the second and third scenario. Angola, Malawi and Tanzania are likely to experi-
ence small decreases in runoﬀ and small increases in demand (relative to the other countries).
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Botswana and Namibia are likely to see moderate to large decreases in water availability,
but only a small increase in demand. Zimbabwe is likely to encounter a large decrease in
water availability, but only a small growth in demand. Mozambique and particularly Zambia
are likely to experience the biggest supply-demand divergence, with Zambia located at the
extreme end of supply-demand divergence spectrum. Figure 7 suggest, therefore, that the
greatest conﬂict potential is among Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe: all three countries
are likely to experience a large decrease in water availability, but their projected demand
growth diﬀers by a very large amount. It appears quite likely that (downstream) Mozam-
bique and (contiguous) Zimbabwe will challenge Zambia at some not too distant point in
time if the latter expands its water consumption as assumed in scenarios two and three.
Figure 7: Changes in availability (runoﬀ) and demand under scenarios two (BD2E2) and
three (CD3E3)
5 Conclusion
The results reported in this paper are obtained under the assumption that the eight ZRB
countries continue to pursue their water policies in a unilateral fashion, that is, in the absence
of eﬀective international cooperation on water allocation issues, as they have done so far.
These results suggest that even under the “middle-of-the-road” scenario the consequences
could be quite dramatic, both in terms of local eﬀects on hydroelectric power production,
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wetlands, and tourism, as well as regional political eﬀects associated with large shifts in
relative shares in total ZRB runoﬀ and water demand in the eight countries. Moreover,
our model predictions are for “average years”, implying that the implications of our water
demand and climate change scenarios could even be much worse in drier than average years
and locations.
Current international institutions governing the Zambezi’s waters are very weak, and it
remains uncertain whether the ZAMCOM agreement, the only international agreement for
the entire ZRB, will enter into force. Even if ZAMCOM becomes operational the constraints
it would impose on the water policies of the individual ZRB countries are very modest. We
think that this institutional setting is probably not going to be able to weather changes in
ZRB runoﬀ in the order predicted by our model. A better system for allocating the Zambezi’s
water resources is urgently needed before distributional conﬂicts arise. Our results suggest
that the most likely such conﬂict is going to occur between Mozambique, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe, with Mozambique and Zimbabwe challenging Zambia if the latter expands its
consumptive water use along the lines assumed in the second and third scenario.
Further research could couple our supply-demand model with an optimization modeling
eﬀort (for a suggestion of this kind see [27]). This approach could generate valuable insights
into how international management of the ZRB’s water resources could be improved. In
particular, it could help in identifying potential national and international solutions (e.g.
water allocation strategies and rules, international water transfers, compensation arrange-
ments) that improve on or avoid the negative consequences of and conﬂicts associated with
unfettered unilateral expansion of water demand, as illuminated in this paper.
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